Titre du document / Document title

Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block : How Not to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

Auteur(s) / Author(s)

O'SULLIVAN Brendan ⁽¹⁾ ;

Affiliation(s) du ou des auteurs / Author(s) Affiliation(s)

⁽¹⁾ Department of Philosophy, Rhodes College, 2000 North Parkway, Memphis, TN 38112, ETATS-UNIS

Résumé / Abstract

In "Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity," Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block's central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that 'thin' side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.

Revue / Journal Title

Philosophia   ISSN 0048-3893 

Source / Source

2008, vol. 36, n^o4, pp. 531-544 [14 page(s) (article)] (1/4 p.)

Langue / Language

Anglais

Editeur / Publisher

Springer, Dordrecht, PAYS-BAS  (1971) (Revue)

Mots-clés anglais / English Keywords

Physicalism ; Dualism ; Mind-Body ;

Mots-clés français / French Keywords

Physicalisme ; Dualisme ; Esprit-corps ;

Mots-clés d'auteur / Author Keywords

Property dualism ; Ned Block ; Stephen White ; Max Black objection ; Thick properties ; Thin properties ; Phenomenal properties ; Qualia ;

Localisation / Location

INIST-CNRS, Cote INIST : 24331, 35400018455221.0100