Titre du document / Document title
Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism = Le libertarisme faible et le compatibilisme fort
Auteur(s) / Author(s)
WATSON G.
(1) ;
Affiliation(s) du ou des auteurs / Author(s) Affiliation(s)
(1) Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside Riverside, CA 92521, ETATS-UNIS
Résumé / Abstract
In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt - which I call soft libertarianism -is represented by Robert Kane's work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options.
Revue / Journal Title
The Journal of ethics
ISSN 1382-4554
Source / Source
1999, vol. 3, n
o 4 (99 p.) (bibl.: dissem.), pp. 351-365
Langue / Language
Anglais
Editeur / Publisher
Springer, Dordrecht, PAYS-BAS
(1997)
(Revue)
Mots-clés anglais / English Keywords
Set of articles ;
Frankfurt (H.) ;
Theory ;
Responsibility ;
Moral ;
Libertarianism ;
Compatibilism ;
Causation ;
Moral agent ;
Liberty;Freedom ;
Indetermination ;
Choice ;
Behavior ;
Attribution ;
Free will ;
Scepticism ;
Metaphysics ;
Determinism ;
Capacity ;
Human ;
Condition ;
Positive vs. Negative ;
Uniqueness ;
Volontary ;
Possibility ;
Mots-clés français / French Keywords
Recueil d'articles ;
Frankfurt (H.) ;
Théorie ;
Responsabilité ;
Moral ;
Libertarisme ;
Compatibilisme ;
Causation ;
Agent moral ;
Liberté ;
Indétermination ;
Choix ;
Comportement ;
Attribution ;
Volonté libre ;
Scepticisme ;
Métaphysique ;
Déterminisme ;
Capacité ;
Humain ;
Condition ;
Positif vs. négatif ;
Unicité ;
Volontaire ;
Possibilité ;
Argument du robot ;
Responsabilité ultime ;
Kane (R.) ;
Principe de l'action libre ;
Alternative ;
Localisation / Location
INIST-CNRS, Cote INIST : 26497, 35400008022973.0050
Nº notice refdoc (ud4) : 1542159
